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ABSTRACT
A treatment of recent criticism of judicial review concentrating on its theoretical
consistency, scope and the use it makes of factual premises regarding the composition
of judicial argument and the practice of democratic assemblies. Focussing on the work
of Jeremy Waldron and Mark Tushnet and to a lesser extent that of Thomas Poole, it
concludes that there are serious difficulties with the liberal challenge on each front.
I INTRODUCTION
Since the second half of the twentieth century, judicial review of legislation
has generally been regarded as a liberal institution.1 Given this perception,
judicial review was always going to be particularly vulnerable to a liberal
contestation of its legitimacy. In recent years, two scholars of impeccably
centre-left credentials, Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron, have led a
challenge against judicial review which questions its ethical sufficiency as
an instrument for designing legal outcomes.2 This critique has become
increasingly influential in liberal legal discourse — perhaps because in
contrast to conservative criticism of ‘judicial activism,’ it is not seen as
politically opportunistic.3 In light of themounting credence afforded to the
challenge, it is timely to assess its substance in some detail.
Thebasic content of the liberal critique is thatwithin certain democracies,4
* Foley-Be`jar Scholar, Balliol College, Oxford. I would like to thank Ravinder Thukral and the
participants at the 2005 Comparative Constitutionalism Conference in Durban, South Africa
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 I use ‘liberal’ to denote the centre-left of the political spectrum in relation to civil liberties,
welfare, equality etc.
2 J Waldron ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,’ as presented at University College,
London on 16 March 2005 in draft version, <www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/download/seminars/0405/
Waldron-Judicial.pdf>; Law and Disagreement (1999); ‘On Judicial Review’ (Summer 2005)
DissentMagazine np,<www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=219> (this is also interesting
for indicating an explicit meeting of minds between Waldron and Tushnet), ‘A Right-Based
Critique of Constitutional Rights’ (1993) 13Oxford J of Legal Studies 18;MTushnet ‘Democracy
versus JudicialReview’ (Summer 2005)DissentMagazinenp,<http://www.dissentmagazine.org/
article/?article=248>, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
3 Anecdotally, my impressions of Oxford Law Faculty’s almost uniformly liberal postgraduate
community certainly suggest a growing enchantment with Waldron’s critique.
4 For Waldron, those possessing ‘(i) democratic institutions in reasonably good working order,
including a representative legislature elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage; (ii) a set of
judicial institutions, again in reasonably good order, set up on a nonrepresentative basis to hear
individual law-suits, settle disputes, uphold theRule of Law, etc.; (iii) a commitment on the part of
most members of the society andmost of its officials to the idea of individual andminority rights;
and (iv) persisting, substantial, and good-faith disagreement about rights (i.e. about what the
commitment to rights actually amounts to and what its implications are) among the members of
the society who are committed to the idea of rights.’ ‘The Core of the Case’ (note 2 above) 13.
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the views of elected bodies should trump those of unelected bodies, such as
courts, because they constitute a product of popular morality.5 The
argument goes that since people disagree about rights, the tenets of popular
morality enjoygreater legal legitimacy than thoseof criticalmorality. It is not
my intention to make a case for judicial review on any basis — moral or
instrumental. My only object is to set out certain deficiencies in the recent
challenges to it. This is not to suggest that the burden is onWaldron et al to
establish why judicial review should not exist in circumstances where a
system of government is being designed from scratch. Whatever defence
judicial review receives in this article is contingent on the subsistence of a
substantive justification for it.
The defects of the liberal challenge are considerable. The two primary
theoretical problems that emerge are incoherence and a lack of ambition.
These are exacerbated by a flawed use of empirical information regarding
the practice of democratic assemblies and the composition of judicial
argument.6 I will address these issues in turn.
II THEORETICAL COHERENCE
The first point to bear in mind is that the challenge itself is based on a
tenet of critical rather than popular morality, namely, that political self-
determination7 should be an individual right.8 However, when critics of
judicial review can point to a particular act of self-determination, such as
a constitutional referendum or an election with high rates of participa-
tion, their critical moral emphasis is conflated with a popular moral
emphasis on self-determination. This is because both elite and popular
moral emphases happen to coincide.9 Yet even when both approaches are
5 Crudely put, popular morality is constituted by the ethical beliefs of a popular majority whereas
critical morality is constituted by the ethical beliefs of an elite.
6 In relation to the composition of judicial argument, I deal with the case made recently by
Thomas Poole against the individual rights rationale for judicial review. Given the alternative
justification he proposes for review, Poole could not be characterised as a full member of the
liberal challenge, but he rightly notes several points of contact between it and his own body of
criticism — see note 53 below.
7 It is important not to confuse political self-determination with political self-expression. Of
course, self-determination is exercised through ‘expressing’ a vote and is facilitated by the
community’s enjoyment of the freedom of expression prior to the vote, but crucially, self-
determination is the act of deciding one’s political destiny.
8 This ismade apparent byWaldron in ‘TheCore of theCase’ (note 2 above) 30-31.There is tension in
Waldron’s description of the ‘imperative’ nature of the right to participate in ‘TheCore of the Case’
and his treatment of it at 232 of Law and Disagreement (note 2 above) as not having any ‘moral
priority’ over other rights, such that ‘talk of conflict of rights is inappropriate in this sort of case.’ Be
that as it may,Waldron does not acknowledge any revision of opinion and since his analysis inLaw
andDisagreement is still cited ashis view (andanargumentwinner at that) in for instanceALYoung
‘APeculiarly British Protection ofHumanRights?’ (2005) 68(5)ModernLR 858, 970 and sinceLaw
and Disagreement provides more detail on this point than Waldron’s recent paper, I tackle both.
Likewise, Tushnet makes the point in ‘Democracy Versus Judicial Review’ (note 2 above) that ‘the
basic principle, of course, is that people ought to be able to govern themselves.’
9 Assuming that an act of self-determination by a given electorate indicates not only its views on
the particular question submitted but also its wish that its views be taken into account.
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in sync, they represent different types of moral calculation. Indeed this
categorical difference is central to the liberal challenge to judicial
review.10
The elitist derivation ofWaldron’s argument can be seen more clearly in
cases where he diverges from popular opinion. In suggesting that his case
applies to Canada and the US,11 Waldron persists in closing his eyes to the
implications of the fact that the Canadian and American peoples either
instituted judicial review, or have spentmore than two centuries of elections
abiding by it. WereWaldron actually following his advice of respecting the
will of reasonable people as to how they wish to be governed he could not
criticise the undemocratic character of judicial review in those democracies
which have adopted it. In reality, Waldron presents us with a proposition
for changing the locus of rights protection from the judiciary to the
legislature because it would represent a better system of government, not
because the current system represents an undemocratic morality. In other
words, Waldron is second guessing the people in the same way in which his
target — judicial review — necessitates the second guessing of their
representatives. Similarly, assertions that a state is undemocratic to the
extent that its electorate continues to disagree with you, on formulae of
government or otherwise, is hardly indicative of the healthy democratic
respect for disagreement which predicates the new liberal challenge. Below,
I examine a number of attempts to address this issue, but we shall see that
the incoherence in the liberal challenge to judicial review remains evident,
to wit, its premise that popular morality trumps critical morality rests on a
critically (and sharply) defined piece of morality, namely a particular
conception of self-government.12
In Law and Disagreement,13 Waldron poses an interesting approach to
this problem by characterising democratic decision making as the correct
method of making decisions about rights not because the individual has a
right per se to participate in her system of government but because
participatory majoritarianism is ‘peculiarly appropriate’ to the task or
‘the most natural’ way of doing so. Waldron thereby attempts justify the
maintenance of a non-judicially reviewable representative legislature
while distancing his theory from critical moral judgment.14 Ironically,
10 Recall that the liberal challenge is based on the putative ethical distinction in a polity’s use of
the products of critical and popular morality given its internal disagreement on moral issues.
11 ‘The Core of the Case’ (note 2 above) 10-11.
12 I should note that there is a body of scepticism about the whole notion of deriving a mandate
for democracy from the idea of the individual having an interest in political self-determination,
see for instance J Raz ‘Free Expression and Personal Identification’ 11 Oxford J of Legal
Studies 303, 309. If this line of scepticism is justified, a liberal challenge to judicial review based
on honouring such an interest could not succeed. Raz’s criticism is not unproblematic though
discussion of it lies outside the scope of this article.
13 Note 2 above. See generally chapter 11.
14 Waldron, at least in Law and Disagreement mode, would object to the characterisation of his
justification as ‘instrumental’ since he criticises instrumental theories of authority. Indeed, it is
precisely his characterisation of the right to participate as deriving its justification from neither
instrumental nor moral grounds which provides the illusion of analytic coherence.
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Waldron provides effective criticism of various consequentialist methods
of deciding what rights a society should enjoy15 — that such justifications
require an unacknowledged moral description of what ‘good government’
actually is. But he remains inattentive to the relation of such matters to
his own theory of authority.16 There is no doubting the ingenuity at play
here; Waldron simply states that people are entitled to some kind of
moral treatment but differ as to what that should be, and goes from there
to saying that the products of popular morality are more legitimate as
laws over people than the products of critical morality, without having
ever staked himself to a particular postulate of either.
But it cannot work. In support of the ‘appropriateness’ of participatory
majoritarianism, Waldron tells us that
it is impossible . . . to think of a person as a rights-bearer and not think of him as
someone who has the sort of capacity that is required to figure out what rights he has. . .
And since the point of any argument about rights has to do with the respect that is owed
to this person as an active, thinking being, we are hardly in a position to say that our
conversation takes his rights seriously if at the same time we ignore or slight anything he
has to say about the matter.17
A better definition of human autonomy would be hard to find.
Individual, active, thinking beings should have a voice in decisions
about their treatment because there is no other way in which such
decisions could provide morally correct outcomes. We find a moral
postulate — the importance of respecting of individual autonomy — and
we find an instrument for realising that postulate — giving each
individual an equal say in decisions about their rights. In other words, we
have a critically predetermined moral destination.
It is useful to look at the implications of the ‘appropriateness’
justification. The problem is not simply that people disagree whether
democracy is the right procedure to reach morally correct outcomes or
whether democracy itself is moral.18 Any such disagreement may result
from people’s failure to appreciate the ‘peculiar appropriateness’ of
democracy to resolve such issues. On his own terms, Waldron owes no
moral regard to the fact of popular disagreement as to the correct theory
of political authority. On the contrary, he characterises himself as
marshalling the legitimacy of popular morality against judicial review
without having committed himself to anything more than a rational
observation — that participatory majoritarianism is peculiarly appro-
15 See in particular Law and Disagreement (note 2 above) 252-254.
16 On this point, see also J Raz ‘Disagreement in Politics’ (1998) 43 American J of Jurisprudence
47.
17 Law and Disagreement (note 2 above) 251.
18 See for instance the arguments of C Fabre in ‘The Dignity of Rights’ (2000) 20 Oxford J of
Legal Studies 271, 275-6, ‘A Philosophical Argument for a Bill of Rights’ (2000) 30 British J of
Political Science 77, 93 and T Christiano ‘Waldron on Law and Disagreement’ (200) 19 Law &
Philosophy 513, 520.
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priate for making law. Moreover, producing incontrovertible counter-
arguments that ‘prove’ the pragmatic failure of participatory majoritar-
ianism in any or all scenarios does not deal with Waldron’s case because
he is talking of a special form of right — ‘the right of rights’ — rather
than simply the best way of producing good outcomes.19 A key element
of Waldron’s argument is that it claims, at least when at its strongest in
Law and Disagreement,20 to make neither an instrumental or normative
justification for participation. Until we prove the justification’s ultimate
moral basis, the existence of popular disagreement with participation is
irrelevant to our criticism. Nor is it pertinent that citizens may disagree
on which form of democracy is best. There is no reason to believe that
Waldron would not recognise its most appropriate version — at which
point he would don the hat of rational observer rather than critical or
popular moralist. Consequently, the mere fact of disagreement as to the
best version of participatory majoritarianism cannot be used to say that
in reality Waldron must make a normative procedural choice.
The difficulty with Waldron’s argument is that the best reason he gives
for using participation — that respecting the rights of a rational entity
would only be an intelligible endeavour if we thought the entity worthy of
participating in our decision as to how to respect his rights — is based on
a normatively contestable proposition. Framing in terms of intelligibility
suggests a question of logic rather than morality. But the treatment of
others in a manner that is moral by its own lights while ignoring the views
of those treated is a perfectly intelligible activity. To say that humans are
individual rational agents and that this autonomous rationality should
somehow define how their rights are determined is effectively the same as
advocating a right of self-determination — the consummation of
individual rationality. Respect for individual rationality is a moral
proposition at odds with many other moral propositions as to what rights
humans deserve to possess. Various religious movements would place far
more emphasis on what morality God decrees for his creations. It would
make no sense for such movements to see a decision making system
which respected individuals ‘as active, thinking beings’ as a morally
neutral one. Divine instructions might very well take the moral treatment
due to people seriously but consider them, or some them, too morally
immature to understand the nature of their proper treatment. Likewise, if
rights were to be group oriented, it might be immoral to give each
19 ‘Not only does it not face the question-begging difficulties of rights-instrumentalism, it
[participation] also has the advantage over the latter that it does not consecrate forms of
authority which are radically at odds with those entrusted to rights-bearers in the . . .
contemplation of their rights. In this sense, we can plausibly say that participation is the rights
theorist’s most natural answer to the problem of authority and disagreement about rights.’
Law and Disagreement (note 2 above) 254.
20 See ibid ss 6 & 7, chapter 11.
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individual member of the group, perhaps an extended family, an equal
say in the making and remaking of them.
But let us ignore for a moment the initial deck stacking brought about
by the choice of participatory majoritarianism. Even if a humanistic
secular philosophy comprised the universe of possible moral decisions,
why would an elite group not be better placed to decide on them than
every single human being of majority age — many of whom are dim,
ignorant or both?21 In response to this, Waldron invokes Locke’s dislike
of ‘academic casuistry’ in preference to the ‘clear thinking’ of ordinary
voters.22 But no one engaged in casuistry, sophistry or artifice is thinking
unclearly. On the contrary, they know exactly what they want — why else
would they desire to dissemble? This kind of objection to only allowing
intelligent or educated people to make decisions about rights could only
stand if we were to assume that such people are somehow more likely to
be hypocrites than those who are not fortunate enough to possess
intelligence or education. Against instrumentally justified elitist systems,
Waldron also makes the general point that, ‘[p]eople disagree about
rights; so they simply cannot in their collective capacity follow the
instruction ‘‘Confer the authority to resolve these disagreements on those
persons and procedures most likely to yield the right answer’’ in a non-
question-begging way.’23 This observation is true in relation to most,
perhaps all, instrumentally justified systems but problematically, it begs
the question in relation to itself. Why should Waldron have the
instrumentalist instruction he rightly criticises read ‘Confer the authority
to resolve these disagreements on those persons and procedures most
likely to yield the right answer’, instead of ‘on any persons’ (i e including
popular majorities)? The answer could only be that the author believes in
a fundamental individual interest in political participation which can only
achieved by the instrument of participatory majoritarianism. It does not
appear possible, and is inconceivable in Waldron’s case at any rate, to
neutrally designate a universal franchise as the moral decisionmaking
procedure or to characterise it as the zero point in relation to which our
propositions develop moral colouring. Consequently, the claim that
democracy is the most rational way rather than the morally best method
of determining rights is ultimately just a trick of light which cannot undo
the critical moral undercurrent to Waldron’s thesis.
The other element of cover sought by the liberal challenge is in relation
to the apparently widespread popular approval of judicial review.
Waldron provides a detailed account of this position in Law and
Disagreement.24 His argument that a political community cannot
21 This is not an expression of snobbery, simply a questioning of democracy’s ‘rationality’ for the
purposes of determining rights in the absence of a precommitment to a right to vote.
22 Law and Disagreement (note 2 above) 253.
23 Ibid 254.
24 Ibid, see chapter 12 ‘Disagreement and Precommitment.’
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democratically pre-commit to a counter-majoritarian input into the
generation of law works to disguise the elitist moral premise of his case by
implying that the operation of judicial review is not itself a product of
popular morality. It is worthwhile summarising its key elements. First,
Waldron differentiates between the reason for carrying out a proposal
and the character of the proposal itself.25 In other words, although we
should implement judicial review if it has been democratically enacted,
we should not imagine it as being democratic in nature simply because it
has been so enacted. Second, he distinguishes between external causal
mechanisms and external judgment.26 The idea here is that whatever may
be said for an electorate’s continued ownership of a decision at T1 not to
allow itself to do X at T2 where it has committed the means of prevention
to a machine, it is not reasonable to suggest that the community
continues to own the preventative decisions of an external human agent
where the definition and application of X are as vague as a constitutional
text. Third, that it is ‘ludicrously problematic’ from a democratic
perspective to assign difficult decisions on rights to an unelected body
whose members disagree on the content of such rights along the same
lines as the elected body.27 Fourth, that procedural rules about rights are
different to substantive rules about rights in a way which allows the
former to retain their democratic character despite being constitutiona-
lised.28
All four arguments miss the mark. Waldron’s first point is
undoubtedly true. As a defence of his democratic criticism of judicial
review, however, it is irrelevant. Essential aspects of the character of any
proposal for governance are the parameters it sets for its introduction
and abolition. In the case of the mature democracies that constitute
Waldron’s primary targets, the proposals for judicial review, accepted by
the electorates, were evidently premised on both the condition of
democratic approval and the condition of abolition at any time by
democratic rejection. The character of proposals for judicial review as an
element of government cannot be fully appreciated in the absence of such
information. For instance, would we consider democratic a proposal for
judicial review which, though conditioned on democratic acceptance,
presents itself as irreversible by any future electorate? Perhaps, but an
observer would certainly find such ‘irreversibility’ germane to his
understanding of the nature of the proposal. Consequently, we cannot
simply put the matter of judicial review’s democratic conditionality to
one side when analysing whether its contribution to government is
democratic in character.
25 Ibid 255.
26 Ibid 260.
27 Ibid 270.
28 Ibid 276-277.
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Not only is the impact of such conditionality relevant to the character of
judicial review, it is arguably decisive. Some kind of majority rule is a
defining characteristic of government under any conceivable theory of
democracy. The form of the majority rule allows us to determine when a
given electorate is speaking as a political community on a given issue.
There are different types of majorities and hence different formulations
of the rule. But majority rule would have no meaning if it did not
encompass decisions made by an electorate that are reversible by an
equivalent electorate at any time. Where the majority has untrammelled
control over the introduction, form and continuance of judicial review, it
therefore becomes difficult to maintain that proposals for judicial review
are undemocratic in nature. To do so, you will almost certainly need a set
of fundamentals with which to refine the definition of democracy. But
using fundamentals to claim that the majority’s acts are not truly
democratic in character (and are therefore illegitimate) is precisely the
approach against which Waldron initially set his face.
Certain democratic objections to judicial review remain however. For
instance, the argument could be made that while an electorate’s
acceptance of judicial review in a specific act may meet democratic
standards for a certain period, no given electorate has the power to alter,
albeit non-bindingly, the degree of remove between future electorates and
the agents exercising their sovereign powers. Presumably, this limitation
would rest on some conception of self-determination which considers
illegitimate any pre-existing constitutional scenario that qualifies the
exercise of the individual’s freedom of choice. However, as a defence of
the powers of an assembly, it turns the theory of parliamentary
sovereignty on its head. It would require that all legislation granting
the Executive the power to make legal rules expire with each
parliamentary or congressional session. Likewise, agencies set up by
parliament, or indeed the Executive,29 would dissolve with the comple-
tion of each electoral cycle. All this would be required because otherwise
the precise remove between the electorate and the decisions made in its
name would have been altered — in most cases not even directly by a
former electorate but by its representatives. Indeed, it is not obvious why
this logic should not also extend to non-power granting laws made by
previous electorates. What relevant differences are there between a
democratic act which binds a future electorate not to smoke in public
houses, unless it decides otherwise, and one which delegates that
electorate’s power to make decisions on environmental standards to a
particular agent, again for the time being?
Likewise, one might argue that it is ab initio undemocratic for any
electorate to institute judicial review no matter how narrowly democratic
the constitutive act. This restrictive conception of democracy is based on
29 And arguably the nominations made to those agencies.
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the idea that, like a sovereign parliament, an individual’s political
autonomy is so vital at every given moment, that it is not capable being
bound, even by itself in a previous moment. But if it is illegitimate for a
democratic electorate to delegate rule making (or rule breaking) power to
a subsidiary judicial authority, a host of questions arise. How could any
non directly elected official whose tenure is not explicitly tied to the
lifetime of the current parliament wield any form of government
authority? It is of no use to say that such officials or agents have been
chosen by and are answerable to representative institutions — so too are
the courts to the sovereign electorate. Perhaps no government in history
could pass for democratic under such a theory of democracy.
At this point, it is worth analysing what exactly the electorate wants
when it commits at T1 not to do to X at T2. The idea that the people have
two orders of desire at T2, one to do X and the other to stick to its earlier
commitment, is nonsensical. The electorate either wants X or it does not.
Apparent disagreement among the electorate as to what means is
immaterial; having enacted judicial review, the electorate has clearly
established what X means at any relevant point, namely, whatever the
constitutional court, given its understanding of the constitution, says it
does. For now, all we are concerned with is whether the electorate can
coherently reserve a ballpark conception of a right against legislative
violation.
By setting out in its constitution that it does not want X to be done
unless and until the constitution is amended, the electorate has made a
clear signal of democratic intent. When the electorate’s parliamentary
representatives decide nevertheless to do X and are prevented from doing
so by the constitution, the undivided will of the people has been affirmed.
It is no use to say that parliament was elected more recently by the people
and is thus a better barometer of their opinion as to X. The people
themselves established what the barometer of their opinion for X would
be, namely, the constitution. No one can say that the people have
changed their minds on X until they choose to express that development
in the way they freely elected to make their exclusive means of doing so. It
might be argued that surely if a party gains power at an election on a
manifesto of legislating for X, there can be no doubt that democracy calls
for such legislation to be passed. But this too is wrongheaded. If the
majority of the electorate truly wanted X then all that would be necessary
is for them to vote to change the constitutional prohibition of X using the
amendment provisions chosen in their constitution. The constitution was
the democratically chosen litmus test for X, so the question is not why
they voted for the pro X party in the general election if they did not want
X, but why did they decline to change the constitution to allow X, if that
is indeed what they wanted.
If a supermajority is required to amend the constitution to remove the
X prohibition, the results of the latest general election are likely to remain
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irrelevant as to the electorate’s views on X. For example, if the same
supermajority is required to constitutionalise the prohibition as is
required to remove it, the electorate is speaking as a political community
when it declares its representatives incompetent to permit X, despite any
subsequent contrary simple majorities. This is a result of the coherence
between the magnitude of the majority rule used to record the electorate’s
choice to use a special majority rule for particular questions and the rule
thereby enacted. However, it is more difficult to imagine the electorate to
be speaking as a body if it constitutionally prohibited X by simple
majority while requiring a supermajority for its amendment. In the event
of a contrary simple majority, at least in an attempted amendment,
questions might duly arise as to what the electorate actually wants to do
with regard to X. Nevertheless, occasions where the majority rule is
materially more demanding for the amendment of a constitutional
provision than the rule applied in the provision’s original ratification or
amendment seem scarce.
The fact is, of course, that it is materially easier for an electorate to
drive law making via elected institutions than via constitutional
amendment. This is particularly the case under the US Constitution
which sets out an onerous amendment procedure. Some legal theorists
consider this fact relevant to the proper construction of constitutional
theory. Intuitively it seems correct to conclude that parliamentary
legislation is more democratic than the law making opportunities offered
by constitutional amendment. But this is not the case. The greater
material difficulty in law making by constitutional amendment can be
legitimately characterised as a product of the sovereign electorate’s
democratic wishes. To take the US Constitution as an example, article 7
specified that the ratification of nine of the thirteen original states was
required for it to be established (along with its amendment provisions) as
between the ratifying states. This proportion of agreement within the
prospective polity is roughly comparable to that required under the
amendment clause. Consequently, we can hardly maintain that an earlier
electorate stacked the democratic deck on the matter of constitutional
law making such that the amendment clause they ratified did not
represent the American polity’s collective view on the matter. Nor is it
plausible to deny that the amendment clause remains ‘the people’s’
sovereign choice. If we were to dispose of the amendment clause for
nothing other than the fact that it was originally chosen by a long dead
electorate, what would become of the rest of the document? Appealing as
‘material’ differences in degrees of democracy appear at first sight, they
cannot readily be set against each other in a debate concerning law or
political legitimacy.
Waldron’s second argument against the democratic credentials of
judicial review is that an electorate’s decision to constitutionalise a bill of
rights under judicial protection gives it little control over the decisions
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actually made by judges on its typically abstract clauses. This too is
perfectly correct; but neither here nor there. The irrelevance of the point
is not due simply to the fact that human discretion and disagreements
over the morality of rights are an inevitable part of judicial review. If that
were the only reason, an argument could be made the lack of control is
too great a cost in democratic terms. The problem is that Waldron
misconstrues what is actually being determined by the people when they
establish judicial review for constitutional rights.
When the electorate institutes judicial review for certain broadly
formulated rights, it is not deciding to have particular future laws struck
down for specific, detailed reasons. Instead, the people are deciding to
allow persons appointed in themanner set out in their constitution to act as
judicial reviewers of legislation for its compatibility with the principles and
policies chosen by these judges as informed and bounded by the text of the
constitution.Nomore, no less.As such, the decision at T1 to give themeans
to a constitutional court to preventXatT2 is indeed a causalmechanism. In
democratic terms, the constitutional grant to a judge of the power and duty
to review legislation on her best understanding of the constitution is a
necessary and sufficient condition of the future exercise of judicial review.
Indeed, theremaybe fewmore causal relations than the gift of power and its
subsequent exercise. There is no room for doubt as to what the effect of the
electorate’s choice at T1 will be — judges will review until they drop —
hence the electorate retains ownership of its decision.Waldron claims that:
[I]t [judicial review] would not be a form of precommitment that enabled one to rebut an
objection based on the importance of A’s hanging on to his autonomy or, in the case of
constitutional restraint, an objection on democratic grounds.
As we have seen, A hangs onto his autonomy as long as the judges keep
reviewing while citing provisions of the constitution; hence this
democratic objection fails.
We come now to Waldron’s notion that it is ‘ludicrously problematic’
from a democratic perspective to assign difficult decisions on rights to an
unelected body whose members disagree on the content of such rights
along the same lines as the elected body. This concern stems from a
failure to correctly apply his first point, namely, that the reason for
carrying out a proposal and the character of the proposal itself are
different things. This is of course the case with judicial review. The
standard reason, and perhaps the most compelling, to enact judicial
review in a democracy is to help protect minorities from the prejudice of a
careless majority. Unlike judicial review’s democratic conditionality, the
reason it is enacted by the electorate has categorically no relation to
whether the character of the duly enacted judicial review is democratic.30
30 Unless we somehow manufacture a definition of democracy which contains fundamental
prescriptions of the good society that would be violated by the institution of judicial review for
the protection of minorities.
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If it did, we might appreciate how inherently undemocratic it would be to
allow unelected judges to trump the legislation of our elected
representatives for the very reasons the parliamentary opposition voted
against it. Were the rationale for judicial review to go to its democratic
credentials, objectively establishing that courts are better than our elected
representatives at figuring out the ways and means of minority protection
would be relevant to defending it from criticism that it is undemocratic.
When judges and parliamentarians have such similar disagreements
fuelling their conclusions on how to discharge that challenging mission, it
is difficult to rate courts as the substantively more competent forum. Of
course, it can be argued that courts are superior since they benefit from
security of tenure — an argument that rests on the assumption that an
electorate which constitutionally protects minorities is legislatively
indifferent to them. Such indifference may well be true from time to
time, but it can hardly be used to win an argument that judicial review is
democratic in character.
Indeed, unlike the unitary nature of an electorate’s democratic desires
when it elects a parliament which sees its legislation struck down for a
constitutional violation, there may well be conflict in its ideas when it
comes to why judicial review should be enacted. An electorate may not
fully trust itself with minority rights, yet it might allow the appointment
of judges from the echelons of the state’s established majority. Crucially,
such potential contradictions within its reasoning do not interfere with an
electorate’s unitary democratic voice that it wants whatever legislation is
created by its representatives to conform to broadly defined constitu-
tional norms and that any contrary legislation be struck down by a
constitutional court according to its best lights. The issue is whether
judicial review can properly be considered the product of a democratic
theory of political authority, not whether such a theory has been operated
for sensible or coherent reasons As the rationale for judicial review is
irrelevant vis-a`-vis its democratic character, a defence of its democratic
credentials does not have to establish that courts are more competent
than legislatures at protecting minorities. That is a question to put before
an electorate.
Consider Waldron’s comparison of parliamentary regimes which have
enacted judicial review to dictatorships, which do not value equality,
respect or voice.31 Even if we were to grant that the detail of Waldron’s
theoretical argumentation is generally persuasive, the bigger picture
would surely refute it. Countries with judicial review such as South
Africa, Canada and much of Europe can hardly be characterised as not
caring about political equality or voice — if that were so, why did they
bother establishing all manner of elected authorities, such as legislatures
and presidents, whose decisions for almost all purposes define how the
31 ‘The Core of the Case’ (note 2 above) 53.
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state is governed? A rather more likely explanation is that the
commitment of the electorates of such countries to the principle of self-
determination takes a different shape to that of Waldron. This difference
is precisely the sort of disagreement about rights which the liberal
challenge celebrates as not only reasonable but as a reason for letting
electorates make these kinds of decisions. The fact is that they already
have.
Of course, where judges do not anchor their work in positive
constitutional law, however much rope the latter’s vagueness may
furnish, Waldron’s criticism regains its wheels as a genuinely democratic
alternative. However, faced with judges citing constitutional provisions,
Waldron’s alternative cannot claim to supplant their role by noting the
greater political legitimacy enjoyed by principles of popular morality and
attempting to attach this greater legitimacy to itself. Instead, it must
present itself as a critical moral vision — an argument for operating a
jurisdiction’s theory of authority in a particular direction (the abolition
of judicial review), but not as an argument for criticising that theory as
undemocratic or politically illegitimate. Nor can Waldron wash his hands
of the incoherence by implying that even if we have to take a critical
moral stance on how to resolve rights disagreements we cannot therefore
assume that critical moralising is also appropriate on substantive rights
questions.32 This is not only nonsensical but contradictory. Nonsensical,
because if it was legitimate to use a partisan moral position in
determining a society’s legal dispensation in one respect, it can hardly
become illegitimate to continue using such positions when shaping its
laws in other respects. In other words, the critical moralist cannot
authoritatively choose when it is legitimate for others to critically
moralise by appealing to no other theory of authority than his own sense
of morality. Contradictory, because when a theorist is allowed use his
moral position to inform his design of a decision-making procedure for
rights, he is likely to be sensitive to his moral disposition regarding its
outputs. In both ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ and Law
and Disagreement, Waldron himself makes the very same point,
Consider . . . the question whether people have rights to socio-economic assistance and, if
so, whether these rights impose limits on property rights. A person who thinks that the
answer to either question is ‘No’ will probably respond differently to the instruction
‘Design a set of political procedures most likely to yield the truth about rights’ than a
person who believes there are socio-economic rights and that they do place limits on
property.33
In what might best be described as a final attempt to absolve his theory’s
incoherence, Waldron states that there is in any event an unavoidable
32 ‘The Core of the Case’ (note 2 above) 26.
33 Ibid 28 and Law and Disagreement (note 2 above) 253.
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need to find a decision making procedure34 and that there are important
moral reasons relating to legitimacy that arise because of disagreement
and do not arise apart from our addressing the question of decision
procedures.35 Even if true, the relevance of this claim seems highly
dubious.36 But, in any case, the entire basis of Waldron’s argument that
democracy is the right decision procedure is that, in his own words, ‘It calls
upon the very capacities that rights as such connote, and it evinces a form of
respect in the resolution of political disagreement which is continuous with
the respect that rights as such evoke.’37 The conflict here is palpable.
The second reason the new liberal challenge fails is related to the first
but is not based on theoretical incoherence so much as a lack of ambition.
In removing a broad, possibly total, swathe of potentially appropriate
environments for judicial review from the ambit of their primary case,
Waldron and Tushnet end up saying little. Waldron assumes that the
societies in question are committed to rights or in Tushnet’s words are
‘reasonably decent.’38 But these statements are meaningless unless we
know or have a means of determining what exactly those rights are. There
have surely been few societies in history which did not officially consider
themselves to be ‘committed to rights’ of one kind or another. In order to
draw any meaning from a declaration of commitment to rights we need to
start asking normatively charged questions. But as soon as we do so, we
find ourselves in the position of the philosopher kings which Waldron has
set out to debunk. In other words, through holding on to a ‘reasonability’
filter such as a need for democratic societies to have made certain value
judgments rather than others, Waldron is staking out for himself the
strongest ground occupied by the defender of judicial review, namely that
there are certain things which even majorities should not be allowed to
do. This problem is made transparent by Waldron when he describes
what he means by this assumption — not only does he mention the
priority of specific kinds of values such as individualism, he goes on to list
a number of sources from which the society’s ‘commitment to rights’
must be drawn.39 We end up with a set of fundamentals and methods of
discovering them which the good society should uphold, in spite of the
contradictory views or actions of its elected legislature. This, however, is
the very attitude which Waldron criticises as democratically illegitimate
when acted upon by a judiciary.
In his ‘Core of the Case’ paper, Waldron defends his assumption
regarding a democracy’s ‘general commitment to rights’ as reasonable
34 ‘The Core of the Case’ (note 2 above) 26. But of course there is no more need a priori to find a
decision-making procedure than there is to reach particular decisions.
35 Ibid.
36 See note 34 above.
37 Law and Disagreement (note 2 above) 252.
38 ‘Reasonably decent democracies can avoid illiberal abuses without having to call on the
courts.’ ‘Democracy versus Judicial Review’ (note 2 above).
39 ‘The Core of the Case’ 18-19.
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. . . given that the case for judicial review almost always assumes that somehow the
society for which judicial review is envisaged has a Bill of Rights which stands in some
real relation to the views of citizens.40
Waldron is correct in drawing a parallel between his own assumption and
one which underpins most justifications of judicial review. In justifying
the democratic character of judicial review, we noted above that it works
on the basis of ballpark, yet positive, constitutional norms enacted by the
people.
The difficulty with the analogy is that it does not necessarily matter
that when making a case for X, a theorist relies on a premise which she
criticises when it is relied on by the case against X. It all depends on the
nature of the criticism. If one’s criticism of the common assumption when
made in the case against X is that it is internally inconsistent with the rest
of that case, then it is of no consequence that one makes the same
assumption in the case for X. This is precisely what is going on here: the
liberal challenge says that judicial review is illegitimate because despite
our democratic conception of self-government it means treating difficult
questions of rights as matters to be resolved by an elite’s morality instead
of a people’s morality. Basing such an argument on an assumption that
the democracy in question is committed to individual and minority rights
means substituting an elite/critical/personal morality for that of any
number of people’s moral views on rights. Thus the liberal challenge’s
assumption contradicts its argument. Hence, even if the commitment to
rights assumption is used in justifying judicial review, the criticism of
Waldron’s use of that assumption in his case against judicial review still
stands.
In Waldron and Tushnet’s defence, it is fair to say that the considerable
value they place on the principle of political self-determination leads
them to set out fewer fundamentals that an electorate must abide by than
many other liberal lawyers. But even to call this a ‘numbers’ game’ in
terms of moral fundamentals would overstate the difference between the
two liberal schools of thought on judicial review: the fact that Waldron
and Tushnet may advocate fewer moral non-negotiables becomes less
significant when we factor in the weight of the premium they afford to
principle of political self-determination relative to other moral positions.
III VALIDITY OF FACTUAL FOUNDATION
The liberal challenge is not a purely theoretical rejection of judicial review
however. A focus on its lack of utility for achieving outcomes is
particularly evident in Tushnet’s work.41 His point is that the operation
of judicial review in the US has made little positive difference to
minorities and individuals. According to Tushnet, this is because
40 Ibid 60.
41 See chapter 6 of Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (note 2 above).
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generally speaking, judicial review has been successfully exercised only in
a majoritarian context.42 In the Griswold decision43 which declared
unconstitutional Connecticut’s law against the use of contraceptives, the
Supreme Court was merely ‘acting on behalf of a national political
majority that had not yet worked its will through legislation.’44 Likewise,
in Brown,45 the court decision ‘might be best understood as enforcing a
national political view against a regionally dominant one that happened
to have excessive power in Congress’ — an excess which Tushnet puts
down to the seniority of Southern senators and their ability to block non-
race legislation for racist reasons.46 Similarly, in Roe,47 the Supreme
Court was simply acting on behalf of a latent national political
majority.48 Unfortunately, none of these positions is defensible.
The national majority in favour of the legal use of contraceptives was
irrelevant to Dr Griswold whose professional advice on birth control was
subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the State of Connecticut. Of course,
the broader point being made by Tushnet is that the Court does little
independently of a clear national majority. But the Griswold Court’s
intervention against the majority of the relevant jurisdiction to protect
what it saw as an individual right can hardly be characterised as a
majoritarian impulse. Even at the national level, it was not simply a case
of the court following the majority. On the contrary, though a majority of
states and Congress may have been in favour of legalising contraception,
an equally national majority had determined that matters of criminal law
were for the several states to decide for themselves.
Likewise, in Roe, the Court so emphatically invalidated so many laws
throughout the Union that counterfactual speculation as to what future
legislative trends would have brought seems redundant. How could such
speculation control for the totemic impact of Roe on national public
opinion in relation to abortion? How could the number of women who
exercised the ‘right to choose’ in the interim between Roe and the time its
holding is speculated to have become law through nationwide legislation
be accounted for? Moreover, bearing in mind that the Roe Court also
struck down the national majority’s view that such issues are, for
federalist reasons, best left to the several states, how can the longstanding
hostility to abortion rights in dozens of State Capitols be factored out of
the ‘latent national majority’ equation? Indeed, one could argue that it is
ab initio misleading to hypothesise about ‘latent,’ ‘future’ or ‘back-
ground’ legislative majorities since in the context of a state of law there is
no conceptual substance to the notion of a binding public rule which has
42 Ibid 144-152.
43 Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479.
44 Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (note 2 above) 144.
45 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka (1954) 347 US 483.
46 Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (note 2 above) 145.
47 Roe v Wade (1973) 410 US 113.
48 Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (note 2 above) 147.
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not undergone the requisite formality. A more fundamental objection to
Tushnet’s argument remains, however; it is best illuminated by his
approach to Brown.
With Brown, we are told that the minority of racist Congressmen held
too many legislative levers to allow the true majority get its way and
abolish segregation. But these levers were in no way undemocratic — the
reason some senators were more senior (and hence were more likely to
chair committees) than others is that they were elected by the people
more often. Likewise, the ability of racist Congressmen to logroll non-
race bills is a par for the democratic course. Logrolling is a facility that
has been extensively used by elected representatives everywhere, and still
is. If the presence of these phenomena is sufficient for Tushnet to
characterise a minority in Congress as having excessive power, then the
system is broken. And if the alternative democratic system is broken, how
can we object to judicial review on democratic grounds any longer?
Especially when the most prominent subject left standing by the
democratic breakdown is a subject on which the judicial branch is ready
and willing to act.
In tackling the conventional theoretical justification of judicial review,
Tushnet makes another outcome related point, namely that while in
principle a minority will always lose up or down votes and may thus find
itself prejudiced, in practice it will be able to selectively deliver its votes
on the issues that matter to the larger parties in return for favourable
consideration of its own issues.49 Thus, judicial review is unnecessary to
protect minority interests from majority prejudice. So, in contrast to
Tushnet’s earlier argument, we are now led to believe that logrolling is a
remedial feature of democratic government rather than a cause for
breakdown. The problem with this is that in order to roll logs you need to
be in the log yard. In the US, the lack of election by proportional
representation effectively removes this possibility. Whatever chance
might have existed without PR is completely exhausted when we factor
in the heavily slanted electoral districting that characterises American
democracy. In an effort to address these problems, Tushnet points to the
legislative successes that the African-American community achieved
through becoming a ‘core constituency’ in the Democratic Party. But
such legislative successes were hardly due to minority logrolling; the
modern Republican Party has rarely felt the need to champion African-
American causes due to minority electoral pressure since the African-
American community was never going to vote for them. Bargaining
within a coalition where you have no credible intention to join another is
a zero-sum game, where the minority in question only picks up the
influence its electoral numbers would themselves provide.
An outcome oriented point made by Waldron is that courts tend to be
49 Ibid 159.
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less effective fora for rights’ deliberation than legislatures because judges
tend to focus excessively on the appropriate theory of constitutional
interpretation and insufficiently on the relative moral merits of the right
claims in question.50 In the US context at least, this disproportion in the
reasoning of written judicial opinions seems accurate. But it is a
misconception of constitutional rights adjudication to regard the choice
of interpretive theory as of no consequence to the moral analysis of the
rights at issue. In order to interpret any text, a theory of interpretation is
required. The choice of theory will be a moral decision. Some judges
interpret the textually enumerated right in one way because of the value
they placed on the liberty of contract51 consummated at the time the
contract was concluded. Some judges interpret the same textually
enumerated right in a different way because of the value they place on
the non textually consummated liberty of contract of each (succeeding)
contracting generation of citizens. Yet other judges see themselves as
bearing a moral responsibility to set out and apply the moral ‘truths’
intimated by the constitution’s text, thus leading to different conclusions
as to the content of the right. Moreover, the inconsistencies which arise in
the application of these interpretative theories are, at least if academic
debate is to be believed, often attributable to political and moral agendas.
Moral and political agendas are precisely the kinds of value judgments
that help define the relative moral merits of the interests at issue in a
rights deliberation.
An analogous misconception lies at the heart of a recent article by
Thomas Poole.52 Unlike Waldron and Tushnet, Poole does not advocate
the defenestration of judicial review in ‘safe’ democracies. However, he
does launch a sustained attack on its individual rights rationale,
suggesting instead a rationale based on assuring ‘legitimacy’ in
government. Poole associates his own criticism of judicial review with
that of the liberal challenge53 and insofar as it is founded on a
comparably deficient understanding of the treatment which rights receive
in judicial deliberation it merits attention. His case against the traditional
rationale is based on observations of how judicial review actually
operates. But given the defective theoretical approach used for their
interpretation, the observations are largely unsupportive of his thesis.
Poole’s arguments are focussed in British constitutional law and assert
that the classic rights rationale is inadequate because it cannot account
for the importance and pervasiveness of non rights considerations in
judicial rights deliberation. This conclusion is premised — entirely it
seems — on his analysis of the patterns of argument in four judicial
50 ‘The Core of the Case’ (note 2 above) 38.
51 For which one may read ‘self-determination’.
52 Thomas Poole ‘Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review’ (2005) 25 Oxford J of Legal Studies
697.
53 Ibid 720–21.
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review decisions.54 Like Waldron,55 he draws attention to what he sees as
the cursory analysis of the merits of particular rights claims relative to the
emphasis on qualitatively different phenomena such as the basis and
extent of judicial authority, expertise and administrative decency. Before
drawing conclusions from the judicial airtime given to different
arguments, it is useful to clarify the conceptual relationship between
rights and fundamental interests. An individual or minority interest that
is deemed fundamental is protected, in the context of judicial review, by
the attribution of a ‘right’ to that fundamental interest. This ‘right’ may
or may not be sufficient to win the day against the assertion of another
right or a general social interest promoted or protected by legislation.
More generally in legal terminology, the word ‘right’ denotes a claim
which a litigant is legally entitled to realise. There is thus a danger of
discussing the content of judicial argument at cross purposes to the
substance of what a judge is actually analysing. At times Poole appears to
reduce the space he credits judges with discussing rights solely to their
recognition of the pertinence of a particular rights claim.56 Evidently, this
has the effect of considerably underestimating the part actually played by
‘basic questions of justice and morality’57 in judicial review.
There are more fundamental problems with Poole’s critique however.
First, in common with Waldron, he assumes that the fundamental nature
54 Poole claims that these cases are drawn from ‘the contemporary canon.’ Ibid at 703. This is a
remarkable claim given that two of the four, R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith [1996] QB 517
and R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex p B [1995] 1 WLR 98 predate the Human Rights Act
1998 and consequently are about as contemporary in the context of British judicial review as
pre-Marbury v Madison decisions are to its US counterpart.
55 ‘If you read what passes for ‘‘reasoning’’ in Supreme Court decisions, most of it is not about
rights at all. It’s about legal history, or precedent, or jurisdiction, or theories of interpretation
or other legalisms.’ ‘On Judicial Review’ (note 2 above).
56 For instance at 706 of Poole’s article (note 53 above) we find a discussion of the Court of
Appeal decision in R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex p B [1995] 1 WLR 988. After describing
a portion of the judgment where the relevance of the applicant’s right to life is recognised,
Poole characterises the rest of the judgment as dealing with ‘a different question altogether,
namely, what was the appropriate stance of the court in reviewing the decisions of a specialised
body that operated in a fraught environment in which resources were scarce.’ But Poole seems
oblivious to the fact that qualifying the appropriateness of the court’s stance towards review
on the scarcity of health-care resources is to frame the question in the context of a rights
balancing exercise, namely, how the applicant’s interest in life relates to those of other health
authority patients. The court’s discussion of the latter question is thus inextricably linked with
its analysis of the value placed on individuals’ interest in life. At 723, Poole claims that the
trouble with conventional conceptions of rights is that almost any decision by a public body
can count as an interference with individual autonomy or dignity, ‘the concept itself thus
provides little or no guidance as to what should count as an unjustifiable infringement of a
person’s autonomy.’ But the demands of human autonomy do not work in one direction
alone; they can conflict with one another. Where such tension occurs — as it often does in
cases of judicial review — the courts can and do conduct rights balancing analysis to reach the
answer most responsive to their conception of human autonomy. The analysis of the conflict is
not simply a setting off of ‘rights’ against different orders of concern, it is analysis of how
rights ought to be set off against each other. Poole thus shows a flawed understanding of the
conventional conception of human rights — that their balancing plays little or no role in
determining what constitutes unjustifiable infringement of individual autonomy.
57 Ibid 714.
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of certain interests can be rationalised, or at least meaningfully verbalised
at some length. From this assumption, he concludes that the typical
‘brevity’ of such analysis in the cases indicates a lack of judicial interest
therein.58 Yet the assumption is flawed. The morally ‘fundamental’
character of a human interest cannot be rationalised or logically
constructed. In this context, an attribution of fundamentality is the
postulation of an axiom for argument rather than an argument in itself.
Consequently, taking an attribution of fundamentality to a particular
human interest much further than a declaration of the interest’s essential
relationship to human dignity, autonomy etc. is not possible. I am by no
means suggesting that plenty of circular reasoning and well meaning
platitude cannot be presented to accompany these determinations. Indeed
such articulations may occasionally produce stirring rights rhetoric. But
as they do not constitute an analytical addition to a judgment, it is
unreasonable to characterise a judgment’s treatment of a rights claim as a
preliminary matter as indicative of a right’s secondary relevance to the
outcome.59
Second, Poole misunderstands the role played by arguments about the
basis and extent of judicial authority to interfere with legislation or
regulations. He cites R v Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith60 to support his
thesis that rights play only a minor role in judicial review. Poole points to
the emphasis the court places on ensuring that it did not overstep its
authority by declaring unlawful the Ministry’s policy that all personnel
known to be engaging in homosexual activity be discharged from the
armed service. He then concludes that the primary issue in the case did
not relate to rights but ‘other matters.’ This theme runs throughout
Poole’s argument, ‘[a] striking feature of the cases examined . . . was the
central role that issues of relative authority or competence played in legal
argument.’61 Hence, ‘questions relating to constitutional architecture and
decision making authority, not questions of goodness or rightness, form
the staple diet of the judicial review process.’62
There is no doubt that judges frequently emphasise the gravity of
interfering with the will of elected authority, often making this the ratio
of their decision. Indeed, Poole cites the Court of Appeals’ description in
Smith of the Ministry’s policy as ‘supported by both Houses of
Parliament’ as especially relevant.63 But since the only intelligible basis
for the legitimacy of parliament is the manner of its composition, this
concern is ultimately rooted in the value judges place on the individual’s
interest in political self-determination. The views of Britain’s supreme
Parliament represent the consummation of the British citizen’s interest in
58 Ibid 709.
59 Poole (note 54 above) 709.
60 [1996] QB 517.
61 Poole (note 54 above) 712.
62 Ibid 713.
63 Ibid 705.
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political autonomy. The content of the individual’s interest in political
self-determination is defined for the British body politic by majority rule
and protected by the right to elect the members of Parliament. A court’s
qualification of the views of Parliament arguably constitutes a judicial
diminution of that moral interest. Recall that as long as a judge stays
within the broad confines of positive law, philosophising on moral values
such as self-determination is not something for which he may be criticised
as undemocratic or politically illegitimate since it is simply a part of the
job to which he was constitutionally appointed. Of course the products of
judicial reasoning are themselves positive law. But this need not blind us
to the fact that the judicial concern with undercutting elected authority is
founded on the moral value which the courts place on the representa-
tiveness of parliament. What was actually going on in Smith and in
equivalent passages in other cases was an effort to balance conflicting
fundamental human interests — an effort which constitutes genuine
human rights reasoning. Consequently, in this context at least, issues
relating to the relative authority of the courts vis-a`-vis the legislature are
inextricably linked to questions of ‘rightness or goodness’ and cannot be
characterised as a different order of concern.64
Poole attempts to buttress his distinction between rights issues and
‘second-order considerations’ through arguing that concerned as the
latter are ‘with the composition, maintenance and well-being of the
political community. . . they cannot be reduced to serving the needs of the
individual qua individual.’65 But the composition and maintenance of a
democratic political community are premised on the political needs of the
individual qua individual. There would otherwise be little point in
cherishing the principle of ‘one person one vote’ as the sine qua non of
modern democracy. Of course, there are elements in Poole’s ‘second-
order considerations’ which cannot be reduced to rights talk, to wit,
general social interests.66
In relation to a number of the cases cited, Poole draws attention to the
court’s acknowledgment of its lack of specialist knowledge or expertise in
the subject matter of the regulation when compared with the state agency
that produced it.67 The expertise in question invariably lies in the
agency’s apparently superior ability to determine the best policies to be
pursued in the relevant field for the general or national interest. There is
certainly no shortage of goals and means to achieve them which
64 This is not to suggest that the courts do not occasionally engage in tactical retreat from review
in particular cases to conserve their political capacity to review the legislature in the future.
Such manoeuvring is rarely given an airing in the published opinions however and does not
represent the kind of earnest judicial anxiety over the lawful scope of judicial review canvassed
in Poole’s argument.
65 Ibid 712.
66 Poole characterises democratic choices about health, education, defence etc as second-order
considerations. Ibid 711–12
67 Ibid 709.
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Parliament could decide would be in the general interest. When
Parliament decides to introduce minimum sentencing for particular
crimes, individual interests, fundamental or otherwise, could conceivably
be compromised. A discussion of society’s general interest in a given
policy is a central part of judicial review. Few cases involving rights could
be resolved without reference to the interests which Parliament is seeking
to serve in qualifying, directly or indirectly, the rights in question. But it
is difficult to imagine the individual rights rationale for judicial review as
incompatible with extensive judicial consideration of Parliament’s
objectives and the relevant body’s expertise in meeting them. Poole
appears to be led astray through a misinterpretation of what the
individual rights rationale implies. He stresses that it is essential to the
rationale that in fixing the standard of scrutiny, the court addresses itself
primarily to the importance of the right in question and the seriousness of
the threatened incursion.68 As such, judicial emphasis on, inter alia, the
relevant state body’s expertise indicates that rights considerations are not
sufficiently prominent in judicial review for it to be supported by the
individual rights rationale.
But fixing a standard of scrutiny is, by definition, only one part of the
analysis. Having established the degree of scrutiny, the weight of the
state’s reasons for legislating must be considered. Few formulations of
the individual rights rationale permit only minor judicial attention to the
merits or necessities of the state’s legislation, whatever their emphasis on
conditioning the likelihood of review on the importance of the individual
interest at stake. Indeed, it is no wonder that judicial talk of reaching the
appropriate balance between individual rights and the general interest is
so commonplace. It arises because of the evident distinction between the
function of a procedure — protecting individual interests — and the data
the procedure ought to take into account in order to discharge that
function properly.
The difficulty of refuting the classic rationale for judicial review by
isolating the judicial attention given to the general interest served by the
relevant state body and its expertise in the field becomes further apparent
when we consider the context in which such factors are considered. When
a judgment notes the importance of a general interest, 69 it is certain to be
a factor in its conclusion as to whether the threat to the individual interest
justifies review. Likewise, when a judgment refers to relevance of
individual rights or interests, they are certain to be factors in its
conclusion as to whether the general interest or the means to achieve it
asserted by the state should be overridden. Consequently, a court’s
discussion and conclusions regarding the weight of a general interest are
rarely stand-alone considerations. On the contrary, such weightings can
68 See for instance ibid 724.
69 As it does by implication in giving a premium to the proposed means of achieving the general
interest through, say, stressing the expertise of the relevant agency.
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characteristically be understood only relative to the court’s discussion
and conclusions on the individual rights in question.70 In light of this
proximity in the treatment of individual rights and general interests
during judicial review, basing one’s case on the judicial airtime given to
one as if it were at the expense of judicial attention the other is
problematic to say the least.
Using the same flawed theory with which he interprets the operation of
judicial review, Poole proposes an alternative rationale for it based on
‘legitimacy’ where rights and ‘non-rights’ issues are understood to relate
the same underlying concern with ensuring decency and integrity within
the exercise of government power.71 However, Poole’s alternative appears
to be the classic individual rights rationale by another name. Any given
political community’s notions of decency and integrity in the exercise of
government power will find expression in its theory of authority, notably
by way of some notion of the unlawfulness of ultra vires actions. As
noted above, the British theory of political authority finds its traction in
its capacity to consummate the individual Briton’s interest in political
self-determination — a matter of ‘rightness’ or ‘goodness’. Poole gives no
indication that any other meaning represented by ‘decency’ and ‘integrity’
in the exercise of public power is not reducible to other aspects of the
goodness of the state’s relationship with its individuals and minorities.
The poverty of legitimacy as an alternative to individual rights becomes
clear in Poole’s summation that:
a system that encourages claims on the basis of legitimacy is underpinned–and ultimately
justified–by two concerns: an instrumental concern to encourage less fallible decision-
making, and a non-instrumental concern to engender public trust in the operation of
government.72
But within a democracy that is (somehow) not predicated on a notion of
goodness, the worst fallibility that a public decision could possess is a
lack of democratic foundation; thus leaving no room for public decision
by way of judicial review.73 And the goal of engendering public trust in
the operation of government can only be non-instrumental if it is based
on the idea that the government should hold the public trust, which is the
same as saying that it should be accountable to an electorate, which, in
turn, is the same as saying that citizens should be able to determine their
political destiny within the British body politic. So, we find ourselves
back where we began with a moral decision that human beings should
possess certain rights. Of course, ‘legitimacy’ might need to recognise
70 If anything this understates the frequency of relativity in the weighting of general interests; the
argument could be made the no judge is really assessing the importance of a general interest
without his views on the relevant rights claim in mind.
71 Ibid 724
72 Ibid 722.
73 Except of course where it has been provided for in legislation. Positivism, however, is not the
basis on which Poole makes out his alternative rationale.
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more than the right to political self-determination to amount to a
justification for non-ultra vires judicial review. In doing so, however, it
seems unlikely that it could coherently depart from the classic rights
theory it uses to postulate public trust as a non instrumental.
IV CONCLUSION
As is apparent, considerable scepticism is in order regarding the merits of
the liberal challenge to judicial review. Certainly, a defence of the
constitutionalisation of rights does not amount to a substantive
justification for it. Although as the tenor this article suggests, when it
comes to justifications, my own inclination is that the conventional
rationale based on the protection of individual rights is the best
candidate. Moreover, though the natural law or deontological case for
restraining democratic majorities comes under sustained criticism for not
providing a theory of authority with which to resolve disagreement on its
content,74 it cannot yet be entirely dismissed. Its continuing relevance is
due to its potential flexibility towards theories of authority; a given
natural law theory might ethically accept, or even require, participatory
majoritarianism as the decisional mechanism for rights while rejecting its
outcomes in the event that they violate the rest of the theory’s sustance.
We simply need not assume that people have to reach agreement on a
decisional mechanism that is to operate in all circumstances. A state’s
violation of a given theory of justice might well amount to a call to
resistance or subversion of the state for its theorist and anyone persuaded
to adopt his theory. If chaos or civil strife rather than polite disagreement
is a potential outcome of such a theory, we might have reason to consider
it undemocratic or dangerous but not necessarily an invariably worthless
guide for our actions.
74 See for instance Waldron Law and Disagreement (note 2 above) 245.
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